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I. 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from an order granting the Appel!ees' motion to dismiss in a declaratory 
judgment action. Plaintiffs/ Appellants Wendy Knox and Richard Dotson brought the action against 
defendants/appellees State of Idaho, C.L. Otter, Ben Ysura, and Lawrence Wasden, seeking a 
declaration from the Court that I.C. § 67-429B and§ 67-429C are unconstitutional. These statutes 
purport to permit "tribal video gaming" on Indian Reservations within the State of Idaho, although 
they are in plain violation of Article III,§ 20 of the Idaho Constitution, as amended in 1992, which 
prohibits all forms of gambling, with three specific exceptions not applicable here. Nevertheless, 
on September 22, 2007, the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County, 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson presiding, dismissed plaintiffs/appellants' action for lack of standing. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Wendy Knox and Richard Dotson (hereinafter collectively referred to 
as "Knox and Dotson") filed suit on March 13, 2008, (R. p. 3) seeking the declaratory judgment 
from the court that LC. § 67-429B and§ 67-429C are in violation of Article III, §20 of the Idaho 
State Constitution, and enjoining defendants/appellees from enforcing§§ 67-429B and -429C. (R., 
pp. 7-8). 
Defendants/appe!lees (hereafter collectively referred to as "The State") did not file an answer 
to the Complaint but instead filed a motion to dismiss on April 14, 2008. (R., p. 10). The State 
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sought dismissal pursuant to Rule 19, arguing that under Rule 19 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Idaho Indian Tribes (hereinafter "Tribes") must be joined in the suit but such joinder 
was precluded by the tribes' sovereign immunity. (R., p. 26-33). The State also argued that the 
IGRA and the Tribal-State Compact precluded the court from granting the requested relief. (R., pp. 
33-43). 
Knox and Dotson filed an Amended Complaint on June 2, 2008, seeking declaratory relief 
but omitting any request for injunctive relief. (R., p. 140). In response, the State argued that in the 
absence of the request for injunction, the case should be dismissed on the grounds that Knox and 
Dotson lack standing, and repeated its assertion that the tribes were still necessary and indispensable 
parties. (R., pp. 149-152). 
On September 22, 2008, the District Court issued its Order Granting Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss. (R., p. 187). The District Court held that the Tribes were not indispensable parties, (R., 
pp. 194-99) and that the IGRA did not preempt state court actions adjudicating the constitutionality 
of state statutes. (R., pp. 197-98). The Sate has not challenged these determinations in this appeal. 
However, the District Court determined that Knox and Dotson lacked standing based on the 
assertion that the requested relief would not redress their injuries. (R., pp. 198-202). This is the sole 
issue presented on appeal. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
1. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (hereinafter "the IGRA") was enacted by Congress in 
1988 shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Califomia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 
480 U.S. 202, 94 L. Ed. 2d 244, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987). In Cabazon the Court invalidated 
California's regulation of Indian bingo on the ground that such regulation was civil rather than 
criminal in nature and therefore was not authorized by Public Law 280. As a practical result of 
Cabazon, Indian tribes were free to offer gaming on tribal lands subject only to federal regulation 
or to state criminal prohibitions. Although Congress had been considering bills to regulate Indian 
gaming for several years, Cabazon left something of a regulatory vacuum that made the issue of 
Indian gaming regulation more pressing. 
The IGRA was Congress' compromise solution to the difficult questions involving Indian 
gaming. The Act was passed in order to provide "a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by 
Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong 
tribal governments" and "to shield [tribal gaming] from organized crime and other corrupting 
influences to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation." 25 
U.S.C. § 2702(1), (2). 
The IGRA functions by dividing gaming into three categories and intensifying the level of 
regulatory oversight depending on the category of gaming. "Class I gaming" includes social games 
with prizes of minimal value, as well as traditional forms of Indian gaming, and is subject to 
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exclusive regulation by Indian tiibes. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6), 27 IO(d). "Class II gaming" includes 
bingo and card games explicitly authorized by the State, or not explicitly prohibited by the State if 
such games are actually played in the State, but does not include any banking card games or slot 
machines. Id. § 2703(7)(A). Class II gaming is subject to joint regulation by the federal government 
and tribal authorities. Id. § 27 l0(d). 
Class Ill gaming is defined as all forms of gaming that "are not class I gaming or class II 
gaming." 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8). Class Ill gaming includes parimutuel horse race wagering, 
lotteries, banking card games, slot machines, and all games with non-Indian origins. Class Ill 
gaming is lawful on Indian lands under IGRA only if three conditions are met: (1) such gaming is 
approved by the governing body of the Tribe and the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming 
Commission ("NIGC"); (2) such gaming is permitted by the state for any purpose by any person, 
organization or entity; and (3) the tribe and state enter into compact that is approved by the Secretary 
of the Interior. Id.,§ 2710(d)(l). 
The Tribal-State compact is the key to class Ill gaming under the IGRA once the first two 
conditions are met. Under such a compact, the federal government cedes its primary regulatory 
oversight role over class Ill Indian gaming, and permits states and Indian tribes to develop joint 
regulatory schemes through the compacting process. In this way, the state may gain the civil 
regulatory authority that it othenvise lacks, and a tribe gains the ability to offer class Ill gaming. 
See Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. United States, 136 F.3d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1998). The 
IGRA provides that the Tribal-State compact may include provisions relating to a number of issues 
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that arise once class ill gaming begins, including the application of state criminal and civil laws, the 
allocation of jurisdiction between the state and the tribe necessary for the enforcement of gaming 
laws, and assessment by the State against gaming activities in order to defray the costs of regulation. 
In any event, the compact must comply with IGRA's requirement "state class III gaming 
activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are [ ] located in a state that 
permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity." Artichoke Joe's 
Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 720-21 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). 
The compacting process begins when a tribe requests negotiations with the state in which 
its lands are located. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A). The IGRA provides jurisdiction in the federal courts to 
hear a claim by a tribe that a state has failed to negotiate in "good faith." Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A). If 
a court finds that a state failed to negotiate in good faith, the IGRA permits the court to order the 
state and the tribe to conclude a compact within 60 days. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii). If the parties are 
unable to agree to a compact within this period of time, the IGRA directs the parties to submit their 
"last best offer for a compact" to a mediator who will then select the more appropriate plan. Id. § 
2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). In detennining whether a state negotiated in good faith, the IGRA pennits courts 
to "take into account the public interest, public safety, criminality, financial integrity, and adverse 
economic impacts on existing gaming activities." Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(II). 
For a thorough discussion of the background and operation of the IGRA, from which the 
foregoing is excerpted, see Artichoke Joe's, Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 
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2003), and (affirming)Artichokeloe's Cal. GrandCasinov. Norton, 216 F.Supp.2d 1084 (E.D. Cal. 
2002). 
2. Article Ill. § 20, Idaho Constitution. 
Pursuant to the IGRA, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe asked the State of Idaho on April 15, 1992, 
to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a tribal-state compact governing Class ID 
gaming activities on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation in Idaho. The Kootenai and Nez Perce Tribes 
requested such negotiations with the State on June 8, 1992, and July 22, 1992, respectively. During 
the summer of 1992, Idaho called a special session of its legislature, enacted legislation, and drafted 
a proposed constitutional amendment changing Idaho law regarding gaming. The Tribes filed suit, 
contending 'that these actions were taken to prevent them from conducting certain Class ID gaming 
activities on their reservations. Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. State, 842 F. Supp. 1268, 1269 (D. Idaho 
1994). 
Prior to 1988, Article ID, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution provided as follows: "The 
legislature shall not authorize any lottery or gift enterprise under any pretense or for any purpose 
whatever." Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 842 F.Supp. at 1269. This provision was in effect until the late 
1980s when certain groups within the State pushed for a change in Idaho law so that the State could 
operate a lottery. This movement culminated in 1988, and again in 1992, when Idaho voters passed 
amendments to Section 20, which now reads as follows: 
Gambling Prohibited. -- (1) Gambling is contrary to public policy and is 
strictly prohibited except for the following: 
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a. A state lottery which is authorized by the state if 
conducted in conformity with enabling legislation; 
and 
b. Pari-mutuel betting if conducted in conformity with 
enabling legislation; and 
c. Bingo and raffle games that are operated by qualified 
chruitable organizations in the pursuit of charitable 
purposes if conducted in conformity with enabling 
legislation. 
(2) No activities permitted by subsection (1) shall employ any form of 
casino gambling including, but not limited to, blackjack, craps, roulette, 
poker, bacarrat [baccarat], keno and slot machines, or employ any electronic 
or electromechanical imitation or simulation of any form of casino gambling. 
(3) The legislature shall provide by law penalties for violations of this 
section. 
Idaho Const. Art. ill,§ 20(1)-(3). Pursuant to Subsection (3), the Idaho criminal statutes regarding 
gambling were also changed in 1992, making casino-style and other types of gambling a 
misdemeanor. See Idaho Code§§ 18-3801 and -3802. As a result, prior to the year 2000 tribal 
gaming in Idaho was limited to those expressly permitted by Section 20. 
3. The IGRA and the Tribes' Gaming Compact With Idaho. 
In 2000, the Tribes and the State of Idaho entered into a gaming Compact governing Class 
ill gaming. Sate of Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006). The 
parties intended the Compact to "govern the licensing, regulation and operation of Class ill gaming 
conducted by the Tribes on Indian Lands located within [Idaho]." Id. (citing Compact§ 3(k), also 
part of the Clerk's Record at R., p. 78). The Compact authorizes the Tribes to conduct any class ill 
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gaming activity "that the State of Idaho 'permits for any purpose by any person, organization, or 
entity,' as the phrase is interpreted in the context of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act." Id. at *3 
(citing Compact§ 4(a)). (See also R., p. 80). 
When the Compact was negotiated, the Tribes and State could not agree on what types of 
class Ill games Idaho allowed others to conduct. "Idaho's position was that the electronic gaming 
currently conducted by the Tribes in Idaho is an imitation of casino games and prohibited under 
Idaho and federal law." Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d at 1097. The Tiibes' position was that 
Idaho allowed all class Ill gaming except sports betting. Id. Unable to compromise on the scope 
of permissible class Ill gaming, the parties agreed to seek a declaratory judgment in federal district 
court to determine which class Ill games the Compact authorized. Id. The Tribes and State each 
filed suit in the District Court seeldng declaratory relief. 
While the case was pending in the District Court, the voters of Idaho adopted an initiative 
called Proposition One that authorized Indian tribes to conduct gaming using "tribal video gaming 
machines." Section Two of Proposition One stated that the Indian tribes suffer from 
disproportionate unemployment and poverty and that recently tribes have "proceeded in good faith 
to make major investments in Indian gaming facilities, and [that] those facilities have finally enabled 
the tribes to reduce unemployment and welfare and improve Jiving conditions on their reservations." 
Proposition One informed voters about the disagreement between the tribes and Idaho regarding 
video gaming machines. The voters approved Proposition One on November 5, 2002. Shoshone-
Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d at 1097. 
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Proposition One added two sections to the Idaho Code, 67-429B and67-429C. Section 429B 
purports to allow "Indian tribes ... to conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines pursuant 
to state-tribal gaming Compact which specifically permit their use." LC. § 67-429B(l). Section 
429C authorizes tribes to amend their gaming Compact to pennit the use of tribal video gaming 
machines. The Statues provide as follows: 
§ 67-429B. Authorized tribal video gaming machines. (1) Indian tribes are 
authorized to conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines pursuant 
to state-tribal gaming Compact which specifically permit their use. A tribal 
video gaming machine may be used to conduct gaming only by an Indian 
tribe, is not activated by a handle or lever, does not dispense coins, cmTency, 
tokens, or chips, and performs only the following functions: 
(a) Accepts currency or other representative of value to 
qualify a player to participate in one or more games; 
(b) Dispenses, at the player's request, a cash out ticket that 
has printed upon it the game identifier and the player's credit 
balance; 
(c) Shows on a video screen or other electronic display, rather 
than on a paper ticket, the results of each game played; 
(d) Shows on a video screen or other electronic display, in an 
area separate from the game results, the player's credit 
balance; 
(e) Selects randomly, by computer, numbers or symbols to 
determine game results; and 
(f) Maintains the integrity of the operations of the terminal. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of Idaho law, a tribal video gaming 
machine as described in subsection (1) above is not a slot machine or an 
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electronic or electromechanical imitation or simulation of any form of casino 
gambling. 
Notwithstanding subsection I.C. § 67-429B(2)'s attempt to redefine "slot machines," this Court has 
since held that video gaming machines with the same attributes as described in LC.§ 67-429B(l) 
are simply modern versions of "slot machines" within the meaning of LC. § 18-3810, which was 
enacted in furtherance of Article III, § 20, Idaho Const. See MDS Investments, LLC v. State of 
Idaho, 138 Idaho 456, 65 P.3d 197 (2003). 
During Proposition One's certification process, the Idaho Attorney General conceded that 
the tribal video gaming machines as defined in I.C. § 67-429B "would be construed as slot machines 
or imitations or simulations of forms of casino gambling," that "in light of Idaho's blanket 
restriction on the use or possession of slot machines, it is unlikely that attempts to distinguish Tribal 
Video Gaming Machines from slot machines or imitations thereof under Idaho Jaw will succeed," 
and that "the argument that such a gaming statute or initiative is permissible cannot be premised 
upon an assumption that such gaming is permitted by the Idaho Constitution." (Appendix, p. 5)1 
1 As the State argued in the District Court below, "This Court, however, may consider 
matters of public record susceptible of judicial notice at any stage of a proceeding." (R., p. 23) 
This is true on appeal as well as in the district court. See Crawford, v. Dep't of Corrections, 133 
Idaho 633, 636, nl, 991 P.2d 358, 361 n.1 (1999) ("We take judicial notice of House Bill 73, 
which was not submitted as part of the record on appeal, but is contained in the public records 
maintained by the Office of Legislative Services located in the State Capitol Building.") (citing 
l.R.E. 201(f); Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337,340, 775 P.2d 651,654 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
Howell, 122 Idaho 209,832 P.2d 1144 (Ct. App. 1992)). The "Attorney General's Certificate of 
Review Proposed Initiative Regarding Tribal Video Machine Gaming," included in the 
Appendix hereto, is available to the public on the official website of the State of Idaho Office of 
Attorney General, at http://www2.state.id.us/ag/ops guide cert/2001/C071201.pdf. Appellants 
therefore respectfully request that this Court take judicial notice of the Attorney General's 
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(emphasis added). The State nevertheless rejected the Attorney General's opinion and certified the 
enactment of Proposition One into law. 
After the enactment of§ 67--429B and§ 67-429C and the installation of slot machines, or 
"Tribal video gaming machines," at Fort Hall Casino, Knox and Dotson became compulsive 
gamblers, traveling the short distance from their homes to Fort Hall Casino and gambling 
exclusively on the slot machines there. This was basically the only place they gambled, due to the 
proximity of the Fort Hall Casino. As a result, Knox and Dotson developed clinical and devastating 
addictions to slot machine gambling. Wendy Knox estimates her monetary slot machine losses to 
be approximately $50,000. Richard Dotson estimates his monetary slot machine losses at Fort Hall 
Casino to be approximately $30,000. (R., pp. 142-43). 
Knox and Dotson have suffered not only devastating monetary losses, but also incurred 
additional debt they otherwise would not have incurred, were subjected to intrusive and humiliating 
collection efforts, stress, anxiety, marital and family strife, and tremendous emotional distress. 
Richard Dotson lost his house and job, and committed forgery in order to obtain gambling funds, 
for which crime he was convicted and sentenced. (R., p. 6). Knox and Dotson commenced the 
present action seeking a declaratory judgment that§ 67--429B and§ 67-429C are unconstitutional 
under Article ill §20, in an effort to get the slot machines at Fort Hall Casino removed, thereby 
vastly improving their prospects for recovery from gambling addiction and preventing or 
minimizing further harm to themselves. 
Certificate of Review. 
11 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court en-ed in dete1mining that Knox and Dotson lack standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of I.C. §§ 67-429B and 67-429C. More specifically, whether the 
District Court ened in holding that a declaration that these statutes are in violation of the Idaho 
Constitution does not make it more likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that Knox and Dotson's 
injuries would be redressed. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
When this Court reviews an order dismissing a case for lack of standing pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
l 2(b )(6), the non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in his favor. 
Youngv. City of Ketchum, 137Idaho 102, 104,44P.3dll57, 1159(2002)(citing Orthmanv. Idaho 
Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 961, 895 P.2d 561, 562 (1995)). After drawing all inferences in the 
non-moving party's favor, the Court then asks whether a claim for relief has been stated. Id. "The 
issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer 
evidence to support the claims." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). Dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 
in support of his or claim that would entitled them to relief. Harperv, Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 
835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Ct App. 1992); Hemenway & Moser, Co., 120 Idaho 941,946,821 P.2d 996, 
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1001 (Ct. App. 1991). Indeed the Court's review is not limited to the relief actually prayed for in 
the complaint. The motion to dismiss must be denied if the Court finds that any relief can be granted 
under the facts appearing in the complaint. Id. 
The Court's review under this standard is limited to the facts appearing in the complaint, 
together with those facts of which the court may properly take judicial notice. Owsley v. Idaho 
Indus. Comm'n, 141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455,459 (2005); (R., p. 23) (citing I.R.E. 20l(f); 
Crawford v. Dep't of Corrections, 133 Idaho 633,636 n.l, 991 P.3d 358,361 n.l (1999); Lee v. City 
of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
B. The District Court Erred in Determining That a Declaratory Judgment Will 
Not Redress Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Injuries. 
1. It is undisputed that J.C. § 67-429B and§ 67-429C are in plain violation of 
Art. III. §20 of the Idaho Constitution. 
The Idaho Constitution is unambiguous in its prohibition against all forms of gambling but 
the three enumerated exceptions. As the Idaho federal district court noted, the Idaho Constitution, 
Art. ill, §20, "make[s] clear that only a lottery, pari-mutuel betting, and bingo and raffle games are 
permitted in Idaho. All other forms of gambling are expressly prohibited to everyone, including 
both the State and the Tribes." Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. State, 842 F. Supp. 1268, 1269 (D. Idaho 
1994). Clearly the tribal video slot machines at issue in this case are not lotteries, pari-mutuel 
betting, bingo or raffles games. If that were not enough, Article ill, §20 specifically prohibits 
"casino gambling, including, but not limited to, blacltjack, craps, roulette, poker, bacarrat [baccarat], 
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keno and slot machines, or employ any electronic or electromechOJlical imitation or simulation" 
thereof. Id. (emphasis added). 
The State knew LC. § 67-429B and§ 67-429C was unconstitutional when they were enacted. 
The Attorney General agreed it was likely unconstitutional. (Appendix, p. 5). In a vain effort to 
avoid this conclusion, the State inserted into the statute the Orwellian statement to the effect that 
"these slot machines are not slot machines." See l.C. § 67-429B(2). The State has never denied, 
nor could it deny, that the statutes at issue are unconstitutional. See MDS Investments, LLC v. State 
r>f Idaho, 138 Idaho 456, 65 P.3d 197 (2003) (holding that "video gaming machines" identical in all 
material respects to those purportedly authorized by LC. § 67-429B and operated by the Tribes are 
in fact modernized "slot machines" within the meaning ofl.C. § 18-3810). 
Faced with this embarrassing truth, the State was left with a choice: either (1) abide by the 
Idaho Constitution prohibiting everyone from providing casino gambling, including the Fort Hall 
Casino and other tribes, and thereby suffer substantial financial losses from its share of the "tribal 
video gaming" revenues, or (2) throw up any technical legal argument, in this case Rule 19 and the 
doctrine of standing, and hope something sticks. The State chose the latter. 
2. Decision of the District Court. 
The District Court issued its Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on September 
22, 2008. (R.,p. 187). In its decision, the court briefly discussed the history behind LC.§ 67-429B 
and § 67-429C and the litigation between the State and the Tribes with respect to what gaming the 
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tiibes were allowed to conduct under the IGRA and the tribal-state Compact prior to the enactment 
of LC.§ 67-429B and§ 67-429C. (R., p. 200). The court stated: 
The State and the Tribe agreed to resolve the dispute of what gaming the 
Tribes were allowed to conduct under IGRA by either or both parties filing 
a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Idaho. The parties agreed to abide by the final judicial determination of the 
declaratory judgment action(s). 
Both parties filed suit for a declaratory judgment in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Idaho, which suits were consolidated. Dming the 
pendency of the federal lawsuit, the parties notified the U.S. District Court 
of the passage of Proposition One and the resultant enactment of LC. § 67-
429B and§ 67-429C. Based upon the enactment of LC.§ 67-429B and§ 67-
429C, the State (and consequently the U.S. District Court) shifted its focus 
from the types of games allowed under the Idaho Constitution, to whether or 
not the Compact required the Tribe to submit to renegotiation of the Compact 
in order to utilize tribal video gaming machines. 
(R., p. 200-201). 
The court noted that neither the U.S. District Court nor the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed the constitutionality of LC. § 67-429B and§ 67-429C. (R., p.201). The court determined 
that even if it declared LC. § 67-429B and § 67-429C unconstitutional, "then the Tribe and the State 
will fall back upon their Compact, which allows the Tribe to operate any gaming activity that the 
State permits for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity." (R., p. 201). The court went 
on to state that "whether or how the State or the Tribe might return to the U.S. District Court for a 
finding as to the constitutionality of tribal video gaming machines is a question of interpretation of 
the Compact, which is not before this Court. Whether or not the state will seek to pass other 
legislation, or to amend the Idaho Constitution, is highly speculative." (R., p. 201). 
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The court reasoned that it "cannot speculate as to the outcome of any relitigation or 
renegotiation of the Compact, or any efforts on the part of the State to introduce different statutes 
or even a constitutional amendment." (R., p. 201). As a result, the district court felt that "a 
declaration that l.C. § 67-429B and § 67-429C are unconstitutional does not, without other, 
intervening events, rid the Plaintiffs of the proximity to the slot machines" (R., p. 201-202), and 
therefore "the Plaintiffs have not established standing." (R., p. 202). The Court's reasoning is 
fundamentally flawed and its decision must be reversed. 
3. Plaintiffs' requested relief will redress their iniuries. 
"A plaintiff has standing to challenge allegedly unconstitutional conduct as long as: (1) he 
or she has suffered an 'injury in fact;' (2) there is a 'causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of'; and (3) "it is likely 'the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision."' 
Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419,425 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992)). Accord, Miles v. 
Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641 (1989). 
The only element of standing challenged by the State, and the sole basis for the District 
Court's order of dismissal, is the third requirement - "redressability." To establish redressability, 
"plaintiffs must show that it likely, as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed 
by a favorable decisions." Artichoke Joe's, 216 F.Supp.2d at 1107 (quoting Bemhardt v. County 
of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 869 (9 th Cir. 2002)). 
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In its decision, the District Court dismissed this action because it felt that there was too much 
speculation involved in order for Knox and Dotson's injuries to be redressed. The District Court 
based its conclusion upon the erroneous assumption that even if the statutes are unconstitutional, any 
remedy of any conceivably aggrieved party is limited to the terms of the Compact between the 
Tribes and the State, and that because the outcome of "any renegotiation or relitigation of the 
Compact or any efforts on the part of the State to introduce different statutes or even a constitutional 
amendment" is allegedly "highly speculative." (R., p. 201). In short, according the District Court, 
because these "other intervening events" are required by the Compact to "rid the Plaintiffs of the 
proximity of the slot machines to which they claim to be addicted," likelihood of redressability is 
not established. Id. 
The District Court's reasoning is flawed for several reasons. First, its assumption that its 
hands, and the hands of the entire state and federal judiciary, are entirely circumscribed by the 
Compact is flat wrong. As explained above, IGRA prohibits compacts for class III gaming that is 
not permitted by the state in which the tribe is located. Artichoke Joe's, 353 F.3d at 720-21. "IGRA 
[also] put into effect 18 U.S.C. § 1166, which provides that 'all State laws pertaining to the 
licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited to criminal sanctions 
applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such 
laws apply elsewhere in the State."' Id. 353 F.3d at 722 (citing 18 U.S.C. § l 166(a)). 
A Tribes and the State ofidaho cannot avoid these clear injunctions by compacting them into 
oblivion. This is precisely the type of "patent bootstrapping" rejected by the federal courts. For 
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example, in American Greyhound Racing, Inc., v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (D. Ariz. 2001), 
vacated on other grounds, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002), the Court noted that "Federal courts have 
adopted what the court shall call a 'ceiling' perspective, holding that 25 U.S.C. § 27 lO(d)(l) requires 
compact games to be lawful under state law." Id. at 1067-68 (emphasis added) (citing Citizen 
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Green, 995 F.2d 179, 181 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Santee 
Sioux Tribe of Nebraska, 135 F.3d 558, 564 (8th Cir. 1998)). In other words, "such gaming" is not 
"permitted ·by the state" within the meaning of IGRA if the state allows such gaming in violation 
of state law. Id. 
In short, "[a]ccording to the structure of§ 27 lO(d)(l) and its plain terms, a compact cannot 
make legal class ill gaming not otherwise permitted by state law. The State must first legalize a 
game, even if only for tribes, before it can become a compact term." Hull, 146 F.Supp.2d at 1067 
(favorably quoted and cited by the Ninth Circuit in Artichoke Joe's, 353 F.3d at 720-21 & 724). 
Consequently, a game that purports to be permitted by a state statute that is patently in violation of 
the state's constitution is not a "legalized" game, and therefore is not "permitted" by that state 
within the meaning of IGRA. See id. Thus, under relevant facts virtually identical to those 
presented in the instant case, the court in Hull enjoined Arizona from renewing an existing tribal 
gaming compact because the expiring Compact purported to allow tribal gaming prohibited by 
Arizona law, even though Arizona wished to continue to permit such unlawful gaming. 
Likewise, in Green, the Tenth Circuit rejected as "patent bootstrapping" a suggestion that 
an IGRA tribe-state compact could legalize devices prohibited by state law. Green, 995 F.2d at 181. 
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See also U.S. v. Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians of the Santa Ynez Reservation, 33 F. 
Supp. 2d 862 (C.D.Cal. 1998) (describing games illegal under state law as "uncompactable" and 
therefore the tribe must cease all such gaming). 
Therefore, because the gaming purportedly allowed under the Compact in the instant case 
is prohibited by A1ticle ill §20 of the Idaho Constitution, it is "uncompactable" and prohibited by 
IGRA. Consequently, the District Court erred in concluding that the supposed peremptory and 
mandatory terms of the Compact render speculative the redressability of Knox and Doton' s injuries. 
If the District Court grants the requested declaratory judgment, the Compact is illegal, void, and a 
nullity from its inception, and the State would not be bound by its terms allowing the tribal video 
slot machines. 
If, as the District Court and the State maintain, any further litigation with the tribes or other 
action were required in the event the requested declaratory judgment were granted, the result would 
be a foregone conclusion. "A tribal-state compact is equivalent to a contract." (R., p. 117) (citing, 
inter alia, Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) ("a Compact is, after all, a contract")). 
Federal courts therefore apply general principles of contract Jaw in construing a contract governed 
by federal law.· State of Idaho v. Shoshone-Bwinock Tribes, 465 F.3d at 1098. According to federal 
as well as general principles of contract Jaw, "[a] contract which is plainly illegal is a nullity and 
void ab initio." Total Medical Mgmt. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(internal quotations omitted) (citing Reinerv. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 381, 325 F.2d 438,440 (Ct. 
Cl. 1963)). Thus, the requested declaratory judgment would redress Knox and Dotson's injuries 
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because it would void as plainly illegal the tribal gaming Compact, resulting in the video slot 
machines being prohibited by IGRA. 
That it may be necessary for the State to raise this issue in federal district court once the 
requested declaratory judgment is entered does not somehow render the result "speculative," 
contrary to the District Court's conclusion. Such action by the State and other state officials would 
essentially be self executing and purely mechanical, as in Artichoke Joe's v. Norton, 216 F. Sµpp. 
2d l 084 (E.D. Cal. 2002), a case substantially similar to the present case. In Artichoke Joe's, the 
plaintiffs, California card clubs and charities, challenged the validity of Compact entered into under 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), between the State of California and certain Indian 
tribes. The Compact permitted the tribes to offer Las Vegas style high stakes gaming, including slot 
machines. The Compact were specifically authorized by a California constitutional amendment, 
Proposition lA, which gave the Governor the authority to negotiate and conclude Compact for the 
operation of slot machines and for the conduct of lottery games and banking card games by federally 
recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California. The plaintiffs were prohibited under state 
law from offering similar types of gambling, and argued that they were placed at a competitive 
disadvantage. Plaintiffs al"so alleged that the defendants, various state and federal officers, including 
the Governor and the Secretary of the Interior, violated the IGRA and the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution by creating a tribal monopoly on Las Vegas style 
gaming. Plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the existing Compact 
and to block the execution of any future Compact. Upon addressing redressability, the Court stated: 
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To establish redressability, plaintiffs must show that it is "likely, as opposed 
to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision." Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 869 (9th Cir. 
2002). A "claim may be too speculative if it can be redressed only through 
'the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the court."' Id. 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 119 L. Ed. 2d 
351, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992)). However, a plaintiff can still satisfy the 
redressability requirement in such a case by meeting "the burden . .. to 
adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in 
such manner as to ... permit redressability of injury." Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 562. Thus, in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 120 L. Ed. 2d 636, 
112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992), decided less than two weeks after Lujan, the Court 
held that the plaintiffs satisfied redressability in a suit brought against the 
Secretary of Commerce to require her to reallocate the apportionment of 
overseas military personnel in the 1990 census, even though the President 
would make a final determination on the census. A plurality of the Court 
held that declaratory relief against the Secretary would redress the plaintiffs' 
injuries because "she has an interest in litigating [the census's] accuracy .. 
. [and] it is substantially likely that the President and other executive 
and congressional officials would abide by an authoritative 
interpretation of the census statute and constitutional provision by the 
District Court, even though they would not be directly bound by such a 
determination." Id. at 803. Therefore, although redressability depended 
at least in part on the actions of third parties, the Court was satisfied 
that the third parties would follow and enforce the law thus making 
redressability likely. 
Id. at 1107-08 (emphasis added). 
The Court found the logic and reasoning in Lujan and Franklin persuasive and reached the 
following conclusion: 
As to count II and the lGRA and equal protection claims on the existing 
Compact, the state defendants contend that redressability is too speculative 
to support standing because the tribes are not parties to the suit and a decision 
in the plaintiffs' favor would, therefore, not be binding on them. Moreover, 
they argue that if the court invalidates the Compact and Proposition lA, the 
State would lose its power to stop any continued class ID gaming because, 
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in the absence of a valid IGRA-sanctioned compact, 18 U.S.C. § 1166 gives 
the federal government exclusive enforcement authority over Indian gaming. 
See United States v. E.C. lnvestments, Inc., 77 F.3d 327,330 (9th Cir. 1996) 
("Section l 166(d) grants the United States 'exclusive jurisdiction over 
criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws that are made 
applicable under this section to Indian country."'). Thus, the state defendants 
contend that if the plaintiffs prevail on the merits, the state defendants will 
be powerless to stop any illegal Indian gaming. 
The state defendants' arguments are misplaced for several reasons. First, the 
plaintiffs do not need to prove a negative, namely that the tribes would 
not engage in illegal gaming in order to demonstrate redressability. If 
plaintiffs had to "negate ... speculative and hypothetical possibilities ... in 
order to demonstrate the likely effectiveness of judicial relief," they would 
rarely ever be able to establish standing. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. 
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 78, 57 L. Ed. 2d 595, 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978). 
Second, even if the tribes were inclined to violate IGRA and state penal code 
prohibitions, there is no reason to assume that the federal government would 
shirk its enforcement responsibilities under 18 U.S.C. § 1166 by 
countenancing illegal class III gaming by Indian tribes. Thus, although 
redressability may depend, at least in part, on the actions of third parties, this 
case more closely resembles Franklin than it does Lujan. Indeed, unlike in 
Lujan where it was unclear whether outside agencies would be bound by the 
Secretary of the Interior's interpretation to require consultation for 
international projects, a ruling that invalidates the Compact and Proposition 
IA would conclusively establish the illegality of any continued class ID 
gaming by Indian tribes. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555. The sole contingency, 
therefore, would be whether the federal authorities responsible for 
prosecuting illegal gaming would do so, and, as in Franklin, Made in the 
USA, and Eu, the courl is entitled to expect that they will follow the law. 
Because "plaintiffs need not demonstrate that there is a 'guarantee' that 
their injuries will be redressed by a favorable decision," it is likely, and not 
merely speculative, that a declaratory judgment invalidating the existing 
Compact and Proposition IA would redress the plaintiffs' injuries. Graham 
v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 149 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1998); see 
also Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 284 
U.S. App. D.C. l, 901 F.2d 107, 117-18 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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Id. at 1108 (emphasis added). The court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs satisfied the 
"redressability" element of standing. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit praised this reasoning and 
conclusion of the district court. See Artichoke Joe's, 453 F.3d at 719 n. 9 ("We agree with the 
district court's cogent application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding constitutional 
standing, Artichoke Joe's, 216 F. Supp.2d at 1100-09 .... "). 
This same reasoning and logic is applicable in the present case. Once the declaratory 
judgment is entered that§ 67-429B and§ 67-429C are unconstitutional, those statutes would then 
create no liability, and afford no protection - they are simply void and without effect. Smith v. 
Costello, 77 Idaho 205,209,290 P.2d 742, 744 (1955); State v. Garden City, 74 Idaho 513,524,265 
P.2d 328,333 (1953); Valente v. Mills, 93 Idaho 212,215,458 P.2d 84, 87 (1969). The Class ill 
"video gaming" otherwise allowed by the tribal Compact is therefore not "permitted" by Idaho law 
within the meaning of IGRA and would therefore be prohibited by IGRA as explained above. 
Like Artichoke Joe's, the sole contingency would be whether the federal authorities 
responsible for prosecuting illegal gaming would do so, and, as in that case, Franklin, Made in the 
USA, and Eu, this Court is entitled to expect that they will follow the law. Artichoke Joe's, 216 
F.Supp.2d at 1108. To the extent any action by the State of Idaho is necessary to effectuate the 
Court's declaration, such as the commencement of a declaratory judgment action to have the Class 
ill gaming provisions of the Compact declared void as illegal, again this Court is entitled to expect 
that they will follow the law. The defendants have each sworn to uphold and enforce the Idaho 
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State Constitution when they took office, and they would be duty-bound to enforce the Court's 
constitutional declaration. 
Consequently, redressability in this case does not depend on "unfettered choices of 
independent actors," and the District Court erred in assuming that the defendants and state officials 
would or could refuse to uphold the State Constitution and enforce the law in dereliction of their 
duty. 
Several other courts have also found this logic and reasoning compelling and persuasive and 
have reached the same conclusion. In Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. March Fong Eu, 979 F.2d 
697 (9th Cir. 1992), the plaintiff brought suit against the county bar association challenging the 
constitutionality of Cal. Gov't Code§ 69586, which authorized the number of superior court judges 
for Los Angeles County, on the basis that delays in the superior court deprived litigants of their 
rights to due process and equal protection. The Court addressed redressability, stating: 
Article III mandates that the injury alleged, in addition to being actual and 
personal, be caused by the challenged action and be "likely to be redressed 
by a favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky We(fare Rights Org., 
426 U.S. 26, 38, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976). The party seeking 
to invoke the court's powers must cany the burden of showing that more than 
"speculative inferences" connect the injury to the challenged action. Id. at 45. 
If causation and redressability depend upon "unfettered choices made by 
independent actors not before the courts," ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 
605,615, 104 L. Ed. 2d 696, 109 S. Ct. 2037 (1989), the plaintiff bears the 
burden of "adducing facts showing that those choices have been or will be 
made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of 
injury." Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2137. 
The chain of causation leading from a detennination by this court that the 
dearth of judges in Los Angeles County is unconstitutional to correction of 
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civil litigation delays may appear tenuous. However, it does not at any 
point depend upon the "unfettered discretion" of third parties. Were 
this court to issue the requested declaration, we must assume that it is 
substantially likely that the California legislature, although its members 
are not all parties to this action, would abide by our authoritative 
determination. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 120 L. Ed. 2d 636, 112 S. 
Ct. 2767, 2777 (1992) (plurality). Once the legislature authorized more 
judicial positions for Los Angeles County, Governor Wilson would, 
according to the Bar Association, have a legal duty to fill those positions 
... Even if the new judges were assigned only to criminal and other 
high-priority cases, the speeding of those cases would inevitably reduce the 
delay. in general civil litigation. We therefore conclude that the Bar 
Association has adequately demonstrated that, were this court to rule in its 
favor, it is likely that the alleged injury would be to some extent ameliorated. 
Id. at 701 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002), the appellant state of Utah sued the 
appellees, the Secretary of Commerce and the Acting Director of the Census Bureau, the officials 
who conducted the 2000 census, over the Bureau's use of "hot-deck imputation" claiming that it 
violated 13 U.S.C.S. § 195 and U.S. Const. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3 and seeking an injunction to change the 
official census results. "Hot-deck imputation" referred to the way in which the Census Bureau 
imputed relevant information by inferring that the address or unit about which it was uncertain had 
the same population characteristics as those of a nearby sample address or unit. This increased North 
Carolina's population by 0.4 percent while increasing Utah's population by 0.2 percent, a difference 
which meant that North Carolina would receive one more Congressional Representative, and Utah 
would receive one less Representative, than if the Bureau had not used imputation but instead had 
simply filled relevant informational gaps by counting the related number of individuals as zero. 
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North Carolina intervened after Utah brought suit seeking to change the official census results. The 
Court addressed standing and redressability: 
[W]e believe it likely that Utah's victory here would bring about the ultimate 
relief that Utah seeks. Victory would mean a declaration leading, or an 
injunction requiring, the Secretary to substitute a new "report" for the old 
one. Should the new report contain a different conclusion about the relative 
populations of North Carolina and Utah, the relevant calculations and 
consequent apportionment-related steps would be purely mechanical; and 
several months would remain prior to the first post-2000 census 
congressional election. Under these circumstances, it would seem, as in 
Franklin, "substantially likely that the President and other executive and 
congressional officials would abide by an authoritative interpretation of 
the census statute and constitutional provision .... " 505 U.S. at 803 
(opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). 
Id. at (emphasis added). 
Likewise, in this case just as in Utah and Los Angeles County, were the District Court to 
issue the requested declaratory judgment, it must be assumed that the defendants and other state and 
federal officials would abide by the Court's authoritative interpretation and enforce the Idaho 
Constitution and IGRA, respectively. No speculation is required. No other legislation is required. 
No constitutional amendment is required. No renegotiation of the Compact to allow Class III 
gaming would be permitted. The District Court eITed in finding the contrary. 
It is possible that the State may seek to amend the Constitution, pass other legislation, bring 
additional litigation, or seek to renegotiate the Compact. However, Plaintiffs do not have to show 
that their injuries are guaranteed to be redressed by a favorable decision for all time, and, therefore, 
should not be required to prove that the State will not take any of the above actions. As stated by 
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the Court in Artichoke Joe's, plaintiffs do not need to prove a negative. If plaintiffs had to "negate 
... speculative and hypothetical possibilities ... in order to demonstrate the likely effectiveness of 
judicial relief, they would rarely ever be able to establish standing." Id. at 108. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Appellants have alleged and adduced facts showing 
that it is "likely, as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed" by the requested 
declaratory judgment. Consequently, Appellants have established standing to seek a declaratory 
judgment from the District Court that LC. § 67-429B and § 67-429C are unconstitutional. 




The District Court correctly held has already found that the tribes were not indispensable 
paities (R p. 194-99) and that the IGRA did not preempt State Court actions adjudicating the 
constitutionality of state statutes. (R., p. 197-98). The facts as alleged in the complaint and as 
supplemented by facts of which the District Court has and this Court should take judicial notice, 
establish that Knox and Dotson's injuries will be redressed by a declaratory judgment from the 
District Court that LC.§ 67-429B and§ 67-429C are unconstitutional. Thus they have standing to 
request such a declaratory judgment. Appellants respectfully request that this Comt reverse the 
District Court's decision granting defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and remand the case to the District 
Court for further proceedings. 
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V. 
PRAYER FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Appellants pray for an award of its fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2009. 
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APPENDIX 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF 'THE ATTORNEY C-.iNERAL 
/llllN G. LIINC~ 
July 12, 2001 
The Honorable Pete T. Cenarrusa 
Secretary of State 
HAND DELIVERED 
RE: Certificate of Review 
!:~po.~~ i:-:!!!s1t!ve Regarding Tribal Video Machine Gaming 
Dear Mr. Cenarrusa: 
An initiative petition was filed with your office on June 13, 2001, that would add 
two new sections to Chapter 4, Title 67, Idaho Code. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 34· 
1809, this office has reviewed the proposed initiative and has prepared the following 
advisory comments. It must be stressed that. given the strict statutory timeframe in 
which th is office must respond and the complexity of the legal issues raised in this 
proposed initiative, our review can only Isolate areas of concern and cannot provide in-
depth analysis of each issue that may present problems. Further, under the review 
statute, the Attorney General's recommendations are "advisory only," and the 
petitioners are free to "accept or reject them in whole or in part.• 
BALLOT TITLES 
following the filing of the proposed initiative, our office will prepare short and 
long ballot titles. The ballot titles should impartially and succinctly state the purpose of 
the measure without being argumentative and without creating prejudice for or against 
the measure. While our office prepares the titles, if petitioners would like to propose 
language with these standards in mind, we would recommend that they do so and their 
proposed language will be considered. The proposed initiative has provided a portion of 
such a short title that will be discussed below. 
MATTERS OF SUBSTANTNE IMPORT 
The proposed initiative would create a new provision titled, "Authori:!ed Tribal 
Video Gaming Machines." as Idaho Code § 67-4298. This section would authorize the 
use of video gaming devices on Indian lands with certain limited restrictions. The-
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initiative would also creale a new provision titled. "Amendment of State•Trlbal Gaming 
Compacts; as Idaho Code§ 67-429C. This section would provide for an automatic 
"ratification'' process for changes lo State-Tribal Gaming Compacts consistent with the 
provisions of § 67-4298. 
Title and "Findings and Purpose" 
Before turning to the substantive Issues noted above we will review the Title and 
"Findings and Purpose' section of the proposed initiative. Idaho Code § 34-1809 states 
that "the ballot title shall not be intentionally an argument or likely to c;reate prejudice 
either for or against the measure." The Tille provided by petitioners is "Indian Gaming 
and Self-Reliance Act.." As the Act deals only with the definition of Tribal Video Gaming 
Machines and the process for amending State-Tribal Compacts, the inclusion of the 
term "Self-Reliance· could reasonably be construed as argumentative and may subject 
the Title to E>ttack. 
In like mariner. under section 2, "Findings and Purpose", in subsection (3) the 
statement that the tribes in Idaho have proceeded in good faith will raise some question ;. .. ,· 
as to the stance the State has consistently taken as to the i!leg;;,lity of the gaming 
currently conducted on tribal lands. 
While a proposed bill msiy include a statement of purpose and findings that are 
. subject to dispute, to do so in an initiative creates legal risk. The long title will nee(! to 
describe such disputed findings. However, as noted above. the tltle must not be 
argumentative. Therefore. to place disputed factual findings with a corresponding title in 
an initiative creates the potential that the form of initiative will be challenged as violative 
of Idaho Code§ 34-1809. 
Section 3 - Addition of Idaho Code§ 67-4:298 
The language of the new section to be designated as ldaho Code § 67-4298(1) 
includes certain provisions that will likely be problematic. 
First, that subsection states that "a tn"bal video gaming machine plays onJy lottery 
games ..• ," When read in connection with the later findings tha( these devices are 
neither slot machines nor electronic or e,lectromechanical imitations of any form of 
casino gambling, such a definition could affect what constitute$ a lottery In Idaho. If this 
definition of lottery was adopted and was found to be constitutional, any ot the activities 
available, to the tribes as defined by these sections would be available to the Idaho 
State Lottery. More likely, as discussed below, Tribal Video Gaming Machines would 
be construed as slot machines or imitations or simulations of forms of casino gambling. 
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We note that this subsection does state that the m.>chines shall not be activated 
by a handle or lever. This distinction has lost much of i!s practical significance as the 
slot machine and casino industry currently uses machines with handles and machines 
without handles. 
Another part of this subsection states that a tribal video gaming maehine (TVGM) 
"does not dispense coins or currency.• This language is sufficiently broad lo allow for 
the machines to dispense tokens or chips. Again, it is our understanding that the slot 
industry began using tol<.ens in slot machines that cost one dollar or more to play when 
the silver dollar went out of circulation. 
The;, proposed language in Idaho Code§ 67-429{BX1)(E) also requires that the 
proposed gaming machines or proposed TVGM's select ·randomly, by computer, 
numbers or symbols to determine the game results.' Once again, it is an almost 
universal slot machine industry standard lo employ computer generated random 
numbers. In the recent State District Court cs-se of MBS Investments v. Lance. Case 
No. CV-OC-99-04815-D, Judge Kathryn A. Sticklen. of the Fourth Judicial District in and 
for the County of Ada, issued a Memorandum Decision and order dated May 11, 2001. 
In that decision Judge Sticklen provided an extensive outline of the history and !aw 
surrounding the definition and prohibitions of slot machines. Ultimately, in her 
evaluation. she provic;led a synopsis of that law in a working definition of what 
constitutes a slot machine in the State of Idaho. Judge Sticklen stated: 
This Court determines that the commonly accepted meaning of the term 
"slol machine• is that of a mec!',ar,ical or electronic gambling device by 
which a patron me,y risk money or a token to play a game of chance for 
gain of a prize or money. SpeciflcaDy. a sloi machine pays off by the 
matching of spinning reels. Additionally, Idaho Code §18-3910 places a 
prohibition on ·any slot machine of any sort: Therefore, any mechanical 
or ele,otronlc device by Which a patron may risk money or a token io play a 
game of chance for gain of a prize or money falls within the statute. 
Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 17 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs in that case have 
sought reconsideration of that decision. 
The foregoing characteristics of ·authorized tribal video gaming machines· 
indicate that they would likely be construed to be either slot machines or imitations of 
casino gambling within the meaning of Idaho's Constitution. Given the parameters 
provided by the provisions of the proposed statutory changes found in the initiative, and 
ln light of Idaho's blanket restriction on the use or possession of slot machines, it is 
unlikely that attempts. lo distinguish Tribal Video Gaming Machines from slot machines 
or imitations thereof under Idaho law wili succeed. 
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Proposed Idaho Code§ 67-429(CJ 
The initiative, as proposed, also provides for the addition of a new section 
designated as Idaho Code § 67-429(C). ln that provision, the initiative outlines a 
process whereby the State-Tribal Gaming Compacts currently in existence may be 
amended in order to take advantage of the provisions proposed in the earlier portions of 
the initiative. While there may be some procedural concerns, as outlined below, we 
note that, pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 USC § 271D(d)(1 ), State-
Tribal Gaming Compacts may allow any mbe within the borders of the State of Idaho to 
conduct any gaming if the State "permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, 
organization or entity.· In the Shoshone Bannock State-Tribal Gaming Compact, the 
Shoshone Bannock Tribes are allowed to conduct any and all gaming allowed by the 
State to any other tribe within the State. Accordingly. should this initiative pass and be 
found constitutional, the Shoshone Bannock Tribes, and potentially other tribes. may not 
be required to proceed with the provisions outlined in the proposed section 67 -429(C), 
and would not be bound by the limitations found therein. 
Also, section 87-429(C)(1 ){b) requires that future negotiations be conducted "in 
good faith" between the State and Tn'be. Section 67-429 (C)(1Xb) also provides that 
the negotiations between the State and Tribe regarding the number of machines 
allowed after ten years shall be conducted under "a prudent business standard." This 
phrase ls not defined .ind could easily be interpreted to mean If it were a reasonable ;,-··· 
business decision t.o add machines, the state would have to agree to allow them. If the 
intent of the initiative is to have limited gaming, this provision should be reconsidered or 
~tie. P..1:1@¥~ sho!J.1~ .P.~ ~JiQ~Cl, ·- · · · - ... _. · · · ··· 
W.~. r~f:~IJ'.l.!)'.)end....ihsL'..l.0'1_i;;lo.-l?-rJ.!!2:..k~.-c/§'1J.r:t~- Proposed Idaho Coda § 87· 
429(C)(1 )(b) provides that the Tribes "agree not to conduct Indian gaming outside of v',.--
lndian lands," Without a more specific definition of what constitutes Indians lands, 
disputes could arise over the intended meaning. ''Indian Lands" is a defined term in the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. If that definftlon is the intended meaning, a statement to 
that effect in the initiative could avoid future disagreements over its meaning. 
Section 5 of the initiative provides for what would be considered an emergency 
clause. In an attempt to expedite the effectiveness of the initiative that provision states. 
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of Idaho law. this Act shall be in full force and 
effect immediately upon passage. No further action by the executive or legislative 
branches of the State government are required to implement the provisions of this Act." 
The language of that provision does not take into consideration normal canvassing and 
certification requirements, 
Section 6, which has been labeled severat>ility, states, "it is the intent of the 
voters that, to the extent any term or provision is declared illegal, void, or 
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unenforceable, the legislature take all available steps to enact such term or provision in 
a legal, valid, and enforceable manner, whether through a statute or a proposed 
constitutional amendment." To the extent that this language is an attempt to require a 
future legislature to pass further laws or constitutional amendments in order to assure 
the effectiveness of this initiative, any such attempts will be ineffective since an initiative 
has only the same legal effect as a statute and a future legislature cannot be restricted 
in its actions. Se,e, e.g., Luker v. Curtis, 64 Idaho 703, 136 P.2d 978 (1943); 
Wester!;>erg v. Andrus, 114 ldaho 401. 757 P.2d 978 (1988). 
Article UL § 20, of the Idaho Constitution prohibits all forms of gambling, except 
the types of gambling specifically enumerated in subsections 1 (a} through 1 (c). Article 
lll, § 20, subsection 2 specifically prohibits •·any form of casino gambling including, but 
not limited to, blackjack, craps, roulette. poker, baccarat, Keno and slot machines.· This 
prohibition includes "any elactronic or electromechanical imitation or simulation of any 
form of casino ,:iambling. • 
The proposed initiative seeks to authorize on Indian lands a method of casino 
gambling that in our opinion would be prohibited elsewhere in the state by Art. Ill,§ za, 
of the Idaho Constitution. Legislation that is passed via citizen initiative has the same 
force and effect as legislation passed by the legislature. See, e.g., Westerberg v. 
Andrus. 114 Idaho 401, 757 P.2d 664 (1988). Consequently. the initiative would almost 
certainly be chaNengeo on grounds it would authorize gambling that directly conflicts 
With a constitutional requirement. See, e.g., Simpson 11. Cenarrusa, 130 Idaho 609, 944 
P.2d 1372 (1997) (piohibiling the .secretary of state from implementing certain ballot 
legend requirements promulgated via citizen initiative because those requirements 
violated constitutional provisions). 
In our opinion, the argument that such a gaming statute or Initiative is permissible 
cannot be premised upon an assumption that such gaming is permitted by the Idaho 
Constitution. Rather, the argument that such a law is valid must be based upon the 
following legal assumptions: 
1. The Idaho Constitution does not apply on Indian reservations except as 
provided by federal law and no federal law requires the Idaho Constitution to apply on 
Indian reservations. 
2. Federal law is not offended by a Stale statute authorizing forms of gaming . 
on Indian reservations that would not be allowed elsewhere in the State. 
3. The legislature, or the people through an iniliativ.,, may allow an activity 
on Indian reservations that would be contrary to the Idaho Constitution if allowed 
elsewhere in the Siate. 
I .. 
f-'' 
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We are not aware of any court decisions that answer all of these que$tions. 
Therefore. the proponents of the initiative should anticip.-te ., court challenge if the 
initiative passes. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the enclosed measure has been reviewed for form, 
style and matters of substantive import and that lhe recommondatlons set forth above 
have been communicated to petitioners Coeur d'Alene Tribe and Ne:z Perce Tribe, by 




c: Coeur d' Alene Tribe 
Nez fierce Tribe 
Analysis by: 
WILLIAM A. Von TAGEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
